The
tragedy of Myanmar is receding from the headlines; the junta in NyaPyidaw has
revealed, not for the first time, a highly effective capacity to stifle dissent.
But the recent developments in our eastern neighbour, and our own government's
temporising response, have raised an uncomfortable question we all need to face:
can India afford an ethical foreign
policy?
For many years after
Independence, the answer to that question seemed an obvious one: we couldn't
afford a foreign policy that was anything else. Having fought for our freedom
against colonial oppression, Pandit Nehru and his colleagues saw themselves as
voices for democracy, justice and fairness in the world, and they did not
hesitate to express an Indian view of world affairs steeped in these values.
Nehru and Krishna Menon, in particular, relished doing so: on issues like
Indo-China, South African apartheid and Suez, they saw themselves as giving a
voice to the voiceless and the marginalised of the developing world, often
against the great-power hegemons of the day. Indian foreign policy
pronouncements were regularly couched in the language of transcendent moral
principle. Nehruvian New Delhi spoke often, and our government, for decades,
seemed to take greater satisfaction in being right than in being diplomatic.
Few challenged India's right
to do so: the land of Ashoka, Akbar and Mahatma Gandhi seemed, to many, to have
earned the authority to speak from an elevated ethical podium. But even in those
early years there were those who wondered whether it was wise to transform the
conduct of international relations into a kind of moralistic running-commentary
on world affairs. Our moral superiority began to grate on many otherwise
well-disposed foreigners even when our positions were unexceptionable; but when
we strayed from our own professions of virtue at home, such as over Kashmir or
Goa, our critics found it easy to dismiss our foreign policy as posturing
humbug.
As time began to
tarnish the glow of our independence struggle and the hard realities of national
interest became the principal yardstick for both the conduct and the expression
of our foreign policy, we quietly abandoned many of our ethical formulations.
The gap between profession and practice was in any case becoming more and more
glaring. Silence, or at least discretion, was clearly preferable to moralising -
at least in a world in which the inventors of non-alignment had signed a treaty
with the Soviet Union, the advocates of democracy had suspended it in a state of
Emergency, the vocal opponents of international capitalism had gained the most
from globalisation, and the leading advocate of disarmament had become a nuclear
power. We were now less ethical in our pronouncements, but we were also less
hypocritical.
But it has always
been difficult for a pluralist democracy to entirely overcome its own instincts
in favour of democratic pluralism. So, in Nepal we worked to democratise the
monarchy, and facilitated the country's transition from a state of rebellion to
one of constitutionalism under UN auspices. In Bangladesh we spoke up for
democratically-elected civilian rulers, even when they pursued policies that
were inimical to us (and we have done so again when they are in jail). And in
Myanmar, when the generals suppressed the popular uprising of 1988, overturned
the results of a free election, shot students and arrested
democratically-elected leaders, our government initially reacted as most Indians
would have wanted it to. India gave asylum to fleeing students, allowed them to
operate their resistance movement on our side of the border (with some financial
help from New Delhi), and supported a newspaper and a radio station that
propagated the democratic voice. For many years, we were on the side of
democracy, freedom and human rights in
Myanmar.
And then reality
intruded. China and Pakistan began to cultivate the generals. Major economic and
geopolitical concessions were offered to both suitors; the Chinese even began
developing a port on the Burmese coast, far closer to Calcutta than to Canton.
And the generals of Myanmar, well aware of the utility of what comes out of the
barrel of a gun, began providing safe havens and arms to a motley assortment of
anti-Indian rebel movements that would wreak havoc in the north-east and retreat
to sanctuaries in Myanmar. This was troubling enough, but the clincher came when
large deposits of natural gas were found in Myanmar, which it was clear would
not be available to an India deemed hostile to the junta. Our rivals were
gaining ground in our backyard and we were losing out: the price of pursuing a
moral foreign policy simply became too
high.
So, New Delhi turned 180
degrees. When General Musharraf travelled to Myanmar, Jaswant Singh followed.
The increasingly forlorn resistance operations from Indian soil were shut down.
And New Delhi sweetened the generals' tea for them by providing both military
assistance and intelligence support to their regime in their never-ending
battles against their own rebels. From standing up for democracy, we went to
aiding and enabling an unsavoury military regime. When monks were being mown
down on the streets of Yangon, our government called for negotiations, muttered
banalities about national reconciliation, and opposed sanctions. We also sent
our Oil minister to negotiate an energy deal, making it clear where our real
priorities lie.
All of this, I
should stress, is perfectly understandable. I also agree that New Delhi needs no
ethical lessons from a Washington or London that has long coddled military
dictators in our neighbourhood, notably in Islamabad. Our government cannot be
blamed for deciding that peace with Pakistan is more important than standing up
for democracy there, and that in Myanmar the general's junta is more useful to
us than the general janata. But what are we doing to ourselves as a
civilisation? If Nehru hadn't been cremated, he'd be turning in his grave. Our
policy may be governed by the head rather than the heart, but in the process
we're losing a little bit of our soul.